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1. INTRODUCTION 
In real-world collective decision-making situations, people often form 
coalitions or pressure groups to enhance a decision power, or to demonstrate 
the intensity of their preferences. Compensatory payments, bribing or vote 
purchase, whether they are legal or not, are therefore features commonly 
observed. 
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate these aspects into a formal 
collective choice model, and thereby examine how choices and payments will 
be made in the presence of a possibility of compensation. Specifically, we 
investigate, under several structures of coalitions, the core of collective choice 
with money as a medium of compensatory payments. The possibility of 
compensation is introduced into the model through the willingness to pay 
function of individuals as provided by Groves (1979). 
We first derive a necessary and sufficient condition for nonemptiness of 
cores. We then show thar if there exists a group of individuals with a 
positive measure such that each of its members is being “bribed”， i. e., 
*This in a generalized version of my paper，“Note on the Core and Compensation 
in Collective Choice，＇’ Mathematical Social Science, 1982 (to appear). 
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receiving a positive amount of money, then the social state with such a 
transfer of money cannot be in the core under the simple majority rule. 
This is a condition corresponding to the one implicit in Kaneko (1975), 
where the simple majority rule was considered by a model of a finite n-
person game in characteristic function form. 
We next show, when the structure of coalitions exhibits a monotonicity 
property, that if a social state with some group of a positive measure being 
bribed is in the core, then we necessarily have structure such that the bribed 
group is essentially the one which is in every winning coalition. The group 
of individuals with this property was called by Nakamura (1979) a veto 
group in a model without compensation. Thus, in our model the veto power 
turns into a positive “price”． 
In Section 2, we describe our basic model. InSection 3, the results are 
presented. Part of proofs are given in the Appendix. 
2. THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FUNCTION 
Let T＝〔0,1] be the set of al individuals, and let Y = {x, y, z, ... } be a 
nonempty set of alternative social states. In addition, there is a private good 
which is freely transferable among the individuals. We call it money. Let 
m(.): T→R be a real-valued Lebesgue integrable function representing 
transfers of money. That is, m(t) implies an increment (if positive) or 
decrement (if negative) of money of individual t巴T. We say m(.) is 
feasible if m( . ）巴M,where Mis defined by M= {m(.) Im(.) :T→R, and 
J Tm（仰 （dt）孟O}.
Each individual t巴Thas a utility function ut: Y×R→R satisfying the 
following conditions: 
( i) Continuity in money: For each γ巴Y,the function: ut (y, . ) : R→R is 
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continuous. 
(i) Monotonicity in money: For each （γ，m) and (y,m’〉εY×R,ut(Y, 
m)>ut(y,m’） if and only if m>m’． 
(i) Valuableness: For each (y, m）εY×R and y'E:Y, there exists an 
m’εR such that ut(Y, m) =ut(Y’，m’〉．
(iV) Measurability: For each (y, m), (y’， m’〉巴Y×R,the set {tεTl 
ut(Y, m)>ut(Y', m’） } isLebesgue measurable. 
Continuity (i) and Monotonicity (i) are both natural assumptions. Measura-
bility （的 is just a technical assumption. Valuableness is essential in defining 
the willingness to pay function below. 
Let y,y’巴Yand m（.）巴M be given. Then, by Valuableness and Mo・
notonicity, a function m'(.) :T→R can be defined such that ut(Y, m(t)) = 
ut(Y’，m’（t)) for each t巴T.Hence we obtain a function wt: Y×Y×R→R such 
that ut(Y, m(t)) =ut(Y’，m(t)-wt(Y’；y, m(t))) for each t巴T. The quantity 
v(t) =wt(Y’；y, m(t)) is the maximum amount of money which individual t 
would be willing to pay for alternative y' when the present state is (y, 
m(t)). Or, if v(t) is negative, -v(t) is the minimum amount of money 
which tET would require to accept the move. In this sense the function 
wt is called a切 llingnessto pay function of individual t巴T.
Note that we always have wt(y;y, m(t)) =O, by definition. 
明Teclose this section with the following two lemmas. 
Lemma 1. Let y,y’εY, and let m(. ), m’（．〉εM. Then for each 
tE:_T, ut(Y', m'(t))>ut(Y, m(t)) if and only if wt CY’；y, m(t))>m(t)-m’（t). 
Lemma 2. Let y, y’E:_Y, and let m( . ）己M. Then, the function v( . ) : 
T→R defined by v(t) =wt CY’；y, m(t)) for each t巴Tis Lebesgue measurable. 
Lemma 1 is an immediate consequence of the definition of wt and 
Monotonicity (i). Lemma 2 will be proved in the Appendix. 
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3. CORES WITH COMPENSATION 
Let W be a collection of non-null subsets of T, i. e., those subsets of T 
with a positive Lebesgue measure. We assume TεW. Each member S of 
W is called a winning coalition. A social state (y, m(.)) E:Y ＞くM is then 
said to be dominated by a state (y’，m’〈．〉εY×M if for some SEW we have 
ut(y',m’（t))>ut（γ，m(t)) for a. e. tES. 
and 
Is m’（t) μ(d必 0
In words, a winning coalition S can make a new proposal against a given 
state (y, m(.)) if it is possible to find another alternative y' and a redistri-
bution m'(.) of money within S so that every member in S is made better of. 
Given W, the core〔relativeto W) is defined to be the set of al 
undominated social states (y, m（.）巴Y×M. 明Tedenote it by C(11つ．
We now characterize the core C （日つ．
Proposition 1. A social state (y, m('. ) ）巴YxMbelongs to C（日つ if
and only if for any SεWand any y’εY, 
Is m伽（d必 Jswt（〆；y,m(t))μ(dt) (1) 
Proof. We first show the following fact: 
A state (y, m(. ）ξY＞くM is dominated by a state (y’，m'(. ））巴Y×M
if and only if there is an SEW such that 
Js[m(t）一m'C山 （dt）くf附 ys 
and 
f〆ωμくdの三0 (3~ 
To prove this, let (2) and (3~ be true. By definition, we have 
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ut(Y, m(t)) =ut(y', m(t)-v(t)) for al t巴S,
where v(t) =wt （γ’：y, m(t)). By (2) and (3~ ， we have 
J 5 [m(t)-v(t) ]μ(dt）くfsm’ω納豆O
Let o be a sufficiently small number satisfying 
ω 豆αIμ(S))(j 5 m＇（似 dt）一Is〔m(t）一v（仙 （dの
Define 示瓦（.):T→R by 
玩（t)=[m(t)-v(t）〕＋o for al tE.S, 
= 0 for al tfl_S. 
Then, clearly玩（．〉巴M,and 
(4) 
f/nCのμ 〉手o. (5) 
Moreover, by Monotonicity and (4), we have 
ut(y’，玩（t))>ut(Y',m(t)-v(t)) 
=ut(Y, m(t)) for al tES. (6) 
Hence, (5) and (6) imply that (y, m(. )) is dominated by （ダ，読（．〉〉巴Y×M.
The converse is immediate by Lemma 1. 
Now, it follows that (y, m( . ) ）εY×M is undominated by any (y’， 
m’（．〉〉巴YX M if and only if for any SEW, 
J 5m'(t)μ(dt迎 impliesJ m伽均三 I-z:山’；y,m(t))μ(dt) 
J s -J s 
+ J 5m'(t)μ(dt). 
This is equivalent to the condition that for any SεW, 
f sm’（t)μ(d伝 0implies J 5 m(t)μ(d必 JswtCダ；Mο〉μ 〉
But, this is further equivalent to (1), since (y’，mぺ．〉〉巴Y×M where m" (t) 
=O for a. e. t巳T. This completes the proof. 
Note that (1) implies f m(t)μ(dt)°?.0 for al SEW, because wt(Y;Y, 
J s 一
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m(t)) =O for al tE_T. 
Proposition 1 indicates that a social state (y, m( . ) ）己Y×M will be 
undominated if and only if every winning coalition is compensated enough 
to accept (y, m(. )). From this propsition several results concerning the 
transfer of money at a state in the core can be derived. 
First, we consider the case in which a state is Pareto efficient. A Pareto 
efficient state is the one which is undominated under the unanimity rule, 
i.e., W = {T}. 
Corollary 1. A social state (y, m( . ) ）巴Y＞くM is Pareto efficient if and 
o均ザTm仰向＝0,andj T wtげ；y,m(t)μ(d伝 0for al y’EY. 
Proof. Put W= {T} in Proposition 1. 
Under a Pareto efficient state, transfers of money are arbitrary provided 
they satisfy the other condition. 
Next, we consider the case of a simple majority rule. ＼町esay Wis a 
simple majority and denote it by wna if W={ScTJμ(S)>l/2}. 
Corollary 2. A social state (y, m(. ））巴Y×M belongs to C ( wma) if 
and only if m(t)=O for a. e. tE:_T, andj5wt(Y';y,m(t))μ(dt迎 foral y’ 
EY and al SE.Wma. 
Proof. It will be sufficient to show that μ( {t巴Tlm(t)=FO}) =O. 
Put S。＝｛tETlm(t)>O},and S1 ={t巴Tlm(t）くO}. Then, S0 and S1 are 
mutually disjoint and S0 US1 = {tETI m(t）手O}.
Suppose μ(S0)>0. Since Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] is non-atomic, 
there exists an S2CS0 such that 
0くμ（S2）く1/2. (7) 
Hence, I m(t)μ(dt)>O and, by Corollary 1, I 円 m(t)μ(dt）くo. 
.J S2 .J T-S2 
We then have T-S2$W12a by Proposition 1. Hence μ(T-S2）手1/2.
Therefore μ(S2) =lー μ（T-S2）ミ1/2. But this contradicts (7). Hence μ(S。〉
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=0, and 
m(t）豆0for a. e. t巴T. (8) 
Suppose now that μ(S1)>0. Then, again by Corollary 1, we have 
J T-Si m(t)μ(dt)>O. But this con凶 cts(8), so we have μ(S1) =O. 
Hence, μ({tETJm(t）手O})=μ(S。）＋μ（S,)=O.
The condition given by Corollary 2 is a much stringent one, so that 
it would unlikely be satisfied in general. It indicates, in particular, that 
if there exists a group with a non-negligible size such that each of its 
members is being bribed at (y, m(. )), i. e., m(t)>O, then (y, m(. )) cannot 
be stable under the simple majority rule. It may therefore be interesting 
to examine if it is at al logically possible to have undominated states through 
bribing. 
To consider this question, let us assume that W satisfies a monotonicity 
condition. We say Wis monotonic if SEW and SつStogether imply S’εw. 
Denote by wmo any monotonic W. The simple majority wma is monotonic, 
but not conversely. 
Proposition 2. Let a social state (y, m( . ) ）巴Y＞くM belong to C ( W'"0), 
and let there exist a non-null set VcT such that m(t)>O for a. e. t巴v.
Then, for each SEWm0, either VCS or μ(V-S) =O. 
Proof. Suppose for some UξW,mo V-U千世 andμ(V-U)>O. 
Then, since f m(t)μ(dt)>O, we have f m(t)μ(dt）くO. Hence 
J v-u J Tー （V'-U)
by Proposition l, Tー（V-U)毎日rmo. By monotonicity of wm0, it follows 
that S毎wmofor al ScTー （V-U). Hence, if sεwm0 we must have Sパ
(V-U）千件． Then, lettiing S = U, we have U什（V-U）＊φ This is a 
contradiction. 
Proposition 2 gives a necessary condition: if bribing should yield a 
undominated state at al, the bribed group must be the one which is indis-
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pensible in forming any winning coalition. The member of such a group 
of individuals is called a veto player (see, Nakamura (1979)). Proposition 
2 then says that almost al of the individuals who訂 ebeing bribed must be 
the veto players. 
The following is an immediate consequence of propositions 2 and 1. 
Corollary 3. Suppose that a social state (y, m(. ））巴YX M belongs to 
ccwm0) and that I wt CY’；y, m(t))μ(dt)>O for some S巴wm0and some y' 
J s 
εY. Then, there exists a non-null set VcT such that m(t)>O for a. e. 
tE V, and that either VcS or μ(V-S) =O for each sεwmo. 
Proof. Since J 5m(t)μ(dt)>O for some SEW"10 by Proposition 1，出ere
exists a non-null set VcS with m(t) >O for a. e. tξV. The rest follows 
from Proposition 2. 
Coalition SE wmo is凶 tobe仰 sedto (y, m(. ））ザswt(Y＇以
m(t))μ(dt)>O for some y，εY. Under the simple majority wma, the state 
(y, m( . ) ) cannot be a social choice if some winning coalition is opposed to 
it. On the other hand, under a monotonic wmo other than wma, (y, m(.)) 
can be a social choice only if there exists essentially a veto group of a 
significant size and the veto power is in fact bought at some positive “price". 
This result would explain how often bribing can be observed in real-world 
situations. 
We conclude with a remark that al the results obtained remain true in 
the finite case, i. e., T= {1, 2…，n}. 
APPENDIX 
Lemma 2. Let y,y'EY and let m （.）εM. Then, the function v(.): 
T→R defined by v(t) ＝切tCY’；y,m(t)) for each tE.T is Lebesgue measurable. 
Proof. We need two preliminary facts. 
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Claim 1. For each y, y’巴Y,the function wt(Y’；y,.):R→R is continuous. 
Since ut(y,.) :R→R is continuous by assumption, it follows that for each 
(y’，m’〉巴Y×R and yEY, the set {mεR lut(y',m')>ut(Y,m)} is open in R. 
Then, by Lemma 1, for any real number c we have { m巴Rlut(Y’，m’－c)
>ut(y,m)}= {mERlwt(Y’：y, m)>m-m' +c} = {mεRlwt(y’；y,m)-m>c-
m’｝ , which is open in R. Smilarly, we have { mεRlut(Y’，m’－c）くut(y,m)} 
={m巴Rlwt(Y’；y,m)-mくc-m'}, which is open in R. Since c and m’are 
arbitrary，切tCY’；y,.):R→R must be continuous. 
Claim 2. For each y,y’EY and mεR, let w(t) =wt CY’；y, m) for each 
tET. Then, the function w(.) :T→R is Lebesgue measurable. 
Let c be any real number. Then, by Lemma 1, for any m'ER we have 
{tETlut(Y’，m’－c)>ut(Y, m)} ={tETlwt(Y’；y,m)>m-m’＋c}. By Measu-
rability (i刊， thelatter set must be measurable for any real number m-m' +c. 
Hence w(.) :T→R is measurable. 
Now for any fixed y,y＇巴Yand m（.）ξM, put wt(Y’；y, m(t)) =wt(m(t)). 
For any real number c, let 
T(c) ={tεTlwt(m(t))>c}. 
Since m(.) is measurable. there exists a sequence of simple functions 
{xn(.)} that converges uniformly to m(. ). Let x;i ，…， X~cn) be the values 
which xn ( . ) takes. Then, T is partitioned into measurable subsets T;i，…， 
T~Cn) such that for each i = l,.…k(n) ;tET~ if and only if xn(t) =x~. 
Hence it follows that wt(xn(t))>c if and only if for some i, tET~ and 
wt(xi)>c. Therefore, letting Tn(c)={tεTlwt(xn(t))>c}, we have 
k(n) 
Tn(c) = .LJ {t巴Tilwt(xi)>c}. 
Since w/xi) is a measurable function of t by Claim 2, Tn(c) is measurable. 
By Claim 1, wt(.) :R→R is continuous. Hence it follows that wt(m(t))>c. 
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if and only if there is an n0 such that nミn0implies wt(xn(t))>c. Hence 
we have 
T(c) = U n Tn(c). 
no注l nミno
This implies that T(c) is measurable. 
Hence the function v(.) :T→R is measurable. 
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